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Abstract
This paper aims at a better understanding of the conditions under
which unequal rank or power positions may get permanently established
through asymmetric gift exchange when a gift brings pride to the donor
and shame to the recipient. The central result obtained is that an asym-
metric gift exchange equilibrium can occur only if the importance attached
to social shame by a recipient is smaller than that attached to social es-
teem by a donor. Moreover, an income transfer is more likely to be traded
against social esteem, status, or power when the weight put on these at-
tributes by the donor or patron is higher. We also show that the recipient’s
productivity may take on a rather wide range of values in the domain of
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7feasibility of asymmetric gift exchange, and that, contrary to a commonly
prevailing view, it is even possible that his productivity would be iden-
tical to that of the donor. Finally, the conditions are spelt out under
which the recipient’s eﬀort is more likely to be reduced upon entering into
asymmetric gift exchange relationships.
Keywords: Social esteem, status, power, patronage, gift exchange.









































Gift exchange relationships, in contrast to market-mediated relationships, have
attracted the attention of economists only recently. This new interest emerged,
in particular, within the ﬁelds of development microeconomics and the eco-
nomics of organizations understood as networks of agency relations or contracts.
Drawing inspiration from anthropological writings dealing with gift exchange
and reciprocity in traditional set-ups (see Platteau 1991, for a review), develop-
ment economists have embarked upon devising and testing theories of reciprocal
state-contingent transfers conceived as informal mutual insurance mechanisms
(see, e.g., Kimball 1988; Fafchamps 1992; Coate and Ravallion 1993; Paxson
1993; Townsend 1994; Udry 1994; Morduch 1999; Dercon and Krishnan 2000;
Ligon, Thomas and Worrall 2002). A quid pro quo is clearly involved in these
voluntary transactions since, as pointed out by a renowned anthropologist a long
time ago, ‘everybody is thereby insured against hunger: he who is in need today
receives help from him who may be in like need tomorrow’ (Evans-Pritchard
1940: 85).
Labour relations or contracts provide another interesting application of the
economics of reciprocity. Where eﬀort and quality are diﬃcult to monitor, an
employer may pay workers wages exceeding the market-clearing levels in order
to elicit eﬀort and commitment from them. The extra wage is then conceived
as a gift which the worker returns by providing adequate amounts of eﬀort and
attention (Akerlof 1982; Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl 1998; Fehr and G¨ achter








































7tionary gift exchanges in any ﬁxed wage. Gift exchange takes on an intergen-
erational form when parents promise bequests (including inter-vivos transfers)
to their children in the expectation to receive attention from them in their old
age (Bernheim, Schleifer and Summers, 1985; Hoddinott, 1992; Cox and Rank,
1992; Barham et al., 1997; Johnson et al., 2001). In an alternative approach,
individuals come to the help of their old parents in the hope that, through a
sort of demonstration eﬀect, their own children will behave likewise when they
will themselves reach an advanced age (Cox and Stark, 2005).
A last illustration is the theory of gift exchange proposed by Aoki (2001)
(see also Carmichael and MacLeod (1997) for an approach using evolutionary
game theory), which is actually very close to the type of account most com-
monly encountered in the anthropological literature. In this approach, the gift
serves both as a signal to communicate a willingness to cooperate to a potential
partner, and as a commitment device since, once the gift has been made, the
donator’s interest is to abide by a contract provided that the partner also does
it.
It is noteworthy that in all the above examples transactions appear to be
motivated by exchange rather than by altruism. In other words, the gift and the
counter-gift are a manifestation of enlightened self-interest, or of selﬁshness with
foresight. To characterize them as reciprocal altruism is therefore misleading.
Another important characteristic of gift exchanges as modelled by economists
is that the reciprocal gesture typically takes on the same tangible form as the








































7attention to symbolic as well as to material aspects of gift exchange relation-
ships. As a consequence, there is the possibility that commodities are being
traded against symbolic attributes such as social prestige and political power:
a material gift, which never goes un-repaid, can thus be reciprocated, say, by a
demonstration of loyalty, allegiance, subordination, devotion, etc...
An immediate implication is that gift exchanges can be asymmetrical, taking
place between persons endowed with diﬀerent wealth, rank or social status. In
fact, as we have learned from the works of many anthropologists, more partic-
ularly Malinowski (1922), Mauss (1925), Polanyi (1944, 1968), Belshaw (1965),
Sahlins (1960, 1974), Levi-Strauss (1969), and Bourdieu (1990), the whole point
of the game may precisely consist for the dominant party of making sure that
the tangible beneﬁts or services that he renders (including insurance against the
risk of hunger) can never be (fully) repaid. Being in his debt on the material
level, the donee ﬁnds himself compelled to return the favour on another level,
in ways that inﬂuence the donor’s rank or status. Subordination is created and
perpetuated because the obligation to reciprocate, which is a burden, cannot be
relieved by means of a return gift equivalent to the initial gift (Oﬀer, 1997: 455).
Upon this reading, social prestige and political power originate in asymmetric
gift exchanges.
In interactions where an agent (the donee or beneﬁciary) occupies an inferior
rank or position vis-` a-vis the other agent (the donor or benefactor), the former is
likely to experience a feeling of social shame or, to speak more generally, to incur








































7the reverse side of the prestige or power aﬀorded by the dominating party who
is also the gift-giver. Therefore, in analyzing political power or social status
relationships in traditional contexts characterized by face-to-face (asymmetrical)
relationships, these two mirroring components of utility, one positive and the
other negative, need to be taken into account simultaneously.
So far, economists have made only a few attempts to model social prestige
and social shame simultaneously, and all these attempts are quite recent (Holl-
nder, 1990; Van de Ven, 2002; Gaspart and Seki, 2003; Brennan and Pettit,
2005; Platteau and Seki, 2007). The present paper follows up these eﬀorts,
since it aims at a better understanding of the conditions under which unequal
rank or power positions may get permanently established through asymmetric
gift exchange when a gift brings pride to the donor and shame to the donee. It
is noteworthy that the framework of patronage relations in which the party ben-
eﬁting from a transfer accepts a low status and the accompanying loss of esteem
(and freedom) can also be applied to international relations between aid-giving
and aid-receiving countries, from where power considerations are rarely absent.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 further motivates the
analysis proposed by brieﬂy reviewing two types of relevant literature. First,
attention is directed to the works of social scientists, anthropologists in partic-
ular, that vindicate our approach to power and status ranking. Thereafter, the
rare attempts by economists to model social esteem and shame in a gift exchange
framework are described and compared to the present endeavour. In Section 3,








































7sis on the features of the social esteem function, and we derive and discuss the
equilibrium values of eﬀort levels and transfer amounts. Since our main purpose
is to discover how various dimensions of heterogeneity in the agents’ character-
istics are susceptible of giving rise to an asymmetric gift exchange equilibrium,
the agents are allowed to have diﬀerent eﬀort productivities (owing to diﬀerent
talents or diﬀerent endowments in physical or human capital), diﬀerent costs of
eﬀort, and diﬀerent sensitivities to social esteem and shame.
We are then able, in Section 4, to analyze the conditions under which one
party will prefer to make a transfer and the other party will prefer to accept it,
compared to a situation of autarky. We ﬁnd that an asymmetric gift exchange
equilibrium can occur only if the importance attached to social shame by a re-
cipient is smaller than that attached to social esteem by a donor. Moreover,
the likelihood of asymmetric gift exchange increases with the weight put on
social esteem or power by the donor. Regarding the conditions related to pro-
ductivity levels (or eﬀort costs), we show that, depending on the conﬁgurations
of the esteem coeﬃcients of the two parties, the recipient’s productivity may
take on a rather wide range of values in the domain of feasibility of asymmetric
gift exchange. Contrary to a commonly prevailing view, it is even possible, as
shown in Section 5, that his productivity be identical to that of the donor. The
conclusive section, Section 6, summarizes our main ﬁndings and discusses an








































72 Power or status as asymmetric gift exchanges
To explain power or status diﬀerentiation in terms of asymmetric gift exchange
essentially means that the would-be dominant party tries to involve other mem-
bers of the community in debt relationships. As a matter of fact, by accepting
a gift, the donee manifests his readiness to play the role of the ‘grateful recip-
ient’ (Schwartz 1967: 6). Thereby, he becomes an inferior and a subordinate,
implying that he accepts the orders of the giver and complies with his wishes,
thus rewarding him ‘with power over himself as an inducement for furnishing
the needed help’ (Homans 1961: 319; Blau 1964: 21). In a like manner, Win-
trobe (1998) considers that ‘through the use of gifts, a donor, whether selﬁsh or
altruistic, can obtain power over recipients and induce their cooperation toward
his or her own objectives’ (p. 95).
Patronage relationships in the village societies of many developing countries
seem to be grounded in such unequal exchange mechanisms, as attested by the
frequent characterization of local patrons as ’Big Men’ and the importance of
symbolic exchanges of personal favours and obligations in this context (Polanyi,
1944, 1968; Pitt-Rivers, 1954; Belshaw, 1965; Epstein, 1968; Levi-Strauss, 1969;
Breman, 1974; Scott, 1976; Bourdieu, 1990; Alexander, 1982; Platteau, 1995a).
There are actually two diﬀerent models of patronage and chieftaincy according
to whether the making of regular tangible gifts by the dominant party is an
obligation inherent in his power position, which is pre-established, or a means
used toward creating the hierarchical order itself (Sahlins 1963; Finney 1972).








































7by a willing power-holder, is of more direct interest to the economist. In this
more relevant case, gift exchange is a means by which the relations of domination
and control are established. In the words of Mauss, ‘the person who cannot
return a loan loses his rank and even his status of a free man’, which tends to
happen in lineage-based economies where there is an unstable clan hierarchy
changeable from time to time (Mauss, 1925: p.42; p.97, fn. 79; Gregory, 1982:
p.20).
When considering the emergence of asymmetric power or status relationships
in traditional social contexts, it is clearly important to bear in mind the cost
of subordination for the subject person or the client. There is actually solid
psychological evidence not only that pride is a rewarding emotion commonly
elicited by dominance, but also that shame is an aversive emotion typically
elicited by subordinance, and negatively correlated with self-esteem (Fessler
2001; see also Frank 1985, 1989; Robben and Verhallen 1994; Oﬀer 1997; Clark
and Oswald, 1998; G¨ achter and Fehr 1999)1.
In Fessler’s framework, there is no compensation (e.g., a gift) for social
shame, and this is why people subject to this painful emotion tend to with-
draw from interaction and, if it is not possible, they turn aggressive and attack
the dominating individual in the hope of inverting the dominance relationship
(Fessler 2001: 199-200). His analysis indirectly conﬁrms Bourdieu’s proposition
that, in societies pervaded by highly personalized face-to-face relationships, and
1As pointed out a long time ago by David Hume (1888), in the same way that ‘anger and
hatred bestow a new force on all our thoughts and actions’, it appears that , ‘humility and








































7where there are no institutionalized rules governing access to, and reproduction
of, power, power cannot be established in a direct and brutal manner lest the
whole fabric of the society should be undermined and power prove unsustain-
able. In such circumstances where domination can only be exerted overtly, in its
elementary form (from person to person), the practice of asymmetric gifts made
‘under the veil of enchanted relations’ epitomized by parent-children relation-
ships, is the best method available to would-be patrons or chiefs concerned with
making their authority accepted at a reasonable cost for the subject people:
So long as overt violence...is liable to provoke either a violent
riposte or the ﬂight of the victim -that is, in both cases, for lack
of any legal recourse, the destruction of the very relationship that
was to be exploited- symbolic violence, gentle, invisible violence,
unrecognized as such, chosen as much as undergone, that of trust,
obligation, personal loyalty, gifts, debts, presents itself as the most
economical mode of domination because it best corresponds to the
economy of the system (Bourdieu 1990: 127).
Power is established by manifesting one’s superiority through the distribu-
tion of gifts to would-be supporters. These gifts help build up ‘a capital of
obligations and debts that will be repaid in the form of homage, respect, loy-
alty and, when the occasion arises, work and services’. They form ‘a symbolic
capital’ that secures recognition of power: inasmuch as common people are
obliged to the emerging leader-benefactor without feeling humiliated, they are








































7thus appears as a sort of ‘demonstrative expenditure’, ‘a kind of legitimizing
self-aﬃrmation through which power makes itself known and recognized’. It
can therefore be said that ‘this power awards itself a rudimentary form of in-
stitutionalization by oﬃcializing itself’ (Bourdieu 1990: 125, 131). If gifts are
repeated more or less regularly, power can be durably established in this political
war for rank, distinction and pre-eminence2.
We can now shift our attention to the most relevant economic literature. On
some occasions, when discussing patron-client relationships, economists have
allowed for the possibility that part of the beneﬁts earned by the patrons are
of the symbolic type. This enables them to explain why, for example, patrons
may choose to enter and stay into a pooling arrangement from which they do
not apparently draw beneﬁts comparable to those obtainable under autarky
(Fafchamps 1992; Platteau 1995b). In these works, however, the social shame
experienced by the dominated party (the client) while receiving gifts is over-
looked.
In a pioneer paper, Hollnder (1990) considers the possibility of both positive
and negative social approval in the context of a public good provision problem.
In this setup, agents enjoy the gratitude and sympathy of others if they happen
to have contributed an above-average eﬀort to the production of the public good.
2By contrast: ‘In place of the relationships between persons indissociable from the functions
they fulﬁl, which they can perpetuate only at direct personal cost, institutionalization sets
up strictly established, legally guaranteed relations between recognized positions, deﬁned by
their rank in a relatively autonomous space, distinct from and independent of their actual and








































7In the converse case where their contribution is comparatively small, they suﬀer
from a negative approval eﬀect. On the other hand, Gaspart and Seki (2003)
and Platteau and Seki (2007) have explicitly modelled the two-way eﬀects of
unilateral transfers on self-esteem in the speciﬁc context of an income-pooling
scheme with agents of diﬀerent abilities exploiting a common property resource.
While the former attempt to discover the conditions related to the operation
of the esteem factor under which the eﬀort equilibrium levels obtained under
the scheme are identical to the ﬁrst-best levels (bear in mind that, owing to the
presence of externalities, decentralized eﬀort decisions cannot achieve ﬁrst-best
eﬃciency in the absence of social esteem), the latter examine the conditions
under which the agents would prefer to pool incomes under an equal division
rule, and experience the associated esteem eﬀects, to remaining autarkic and
avoiding such eﬀects. It is noteworthy that, in the second endeavour, but not in
the ﬁrst, sensitivities to esteem are assumed to be identical between agents. One
of the central interests of Van de Ven (2002), on the other hand, is to explain
the existence of reciprocal gifts. Instead of looking for the kind of motivations
commonly used in the economic literature (see supra, Section 1), he explains
gift-giving by a demand for social approval and conceives reciprocal gift-giving
as an instrument in the race for status. However, he does not characterize the
associated equilibrium and, therefore, we can never be certain that a gift made
will be accepted in the assumed presence of social shame.
In contrast, the present attempt does not aim at explaining reciprocal gifts








































7asymmetries. It is true that such states could be viewed as the end outcomes of
a series of rounds in which the agents make gifts and counter-gifts. However, we
have chosen not to follow this path in order to concentrate our attention on the
issue of feasibility of asymmetric states and the precise conditions under which
they may obtain3.
Compared to Platteau and Seki (2007), we want to build a more general
framework in the three following senses. First, the amount of the transfer is
endogenized rather than being ﬁxed by a predetermined rule. Second, the sen-
sitivities to social esteem and shame are left free to vary between the agents.
And, third, the social esteem function is not restricted to a linear form. Unlike
what is done in Gaspart and Seki (2003), we are not interested in comparing the
equilibrium obtained under a transfer scheme with the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient equi-
librium, but in comparing it with autarky. In the situation which we are going
to examine, there are no production externalities and, therefore, the question
as to whether social esteem considerations can possibly mitigate the incentive
problem typical of common property exploitation, does not arise.
3In fact, Van de Ven has not proposed a dynamic game that really depicts the race for
status. Essentially, what he does is to depict the reaction functions of the two agents in terms
of the gifts (or counter-gifts) that they want to make. The equilibria as such are not derived
and characterized, however. Moreover, since there are gifts and counter-gifts, the author
conceives social approval as a net amount obtained by subtracting the negative social esteem
accompanying the receipt of gifts from the positive esteem associated with the making of gifts









































73 The setup of the model and ﬁrst results
3.1 The setup of the model
Two individuals choose their optimal eﬀort level which is the unique and costly
input in the production of a consumption good. The agents are endowed with
diﬀerent productivities, and their disutility of eﬀort may also diﬀer. The pro-
duction function is atomistic (no production pooling is possible across the two
agents) and linear in the eﬀort invested, and the eﬀort cost function is convex.
Each agent derives a positive utility from the total amount produced and con-
sumed, and a disutility from working. We assume that only one agent has the
ability to make a gift that the other agent can either accept or refuse. Part of
the eﬀort applied by the donor is allocated to producing his own consumption
good, while the remaining part is allocated to producing the gift. When a gift is
accepted, the donor, who has chosen the optimal gift-producing eﬀort, achieves
a higher social status or prestige because he contributes to the recipient’s ma-
terial welfare. As for the latter, although he enjoys an increase in utility arising
from the additional consumption allowed by the gift, he also suﬀers from a loss
of status or esteem that negatively aﬀects his utility. Yet, he is only a potential
recipient since he could reject the gift. If he does we are back to a situation
of no interaction between the agents who, being autarkic, derive utility from
consumption of own production alone.
We now turn to the speciﬁcation of the social esteem function. Two possible








































7ventional approach according to which the amount of social esteem or shame
experienced by the agent is proportional to the absolute value of the gift given
or received. In the second approach, social esteem or shame is a function of the
share of the gift in the total consumption of the recipient. We believe that this
approach is more appropriate to describe situations in which power is at stake.
Indeed, the larger the share of the gift in the donee’s consumption, the higher
the degree of his dependence on the donor, and the stronger the power aﬀorded
by the latter. Upon this understanding, even a gift of small (absolute) value
might give rise to a lot of power if it constitutes a substantial portion of the
recipient’s consumption.
This being said, the ﬁrst approach is worth examining since it is actually
devoid of any element of strategic interactions (Indeed, the eﬀort chosen by the
recipient does not aﬀect the esteem value of the gift for the donor). It, therefore,
leads to a rather straightforward result which will be usefully compared to the
more complex results obtained under the second approach.
Let us write a utility function that has three components: a ﬁrst component
which reﬂects the direct eﬀect of own eﬀort (assumed to be linear); a second
component which reﬂects the cost of total eﬀort (assumed to have a convex
form); and a third component, measuring the inﬂuence of esteem, that is a
(non-linear) function of the absolute amount of the gift’s transfer. We thus









































7Ui(xi,ti,xj) = αixi − βi(xi + ti)2 + ugei(αiti)γ (1)
Uj(xj,ti) = αjxj − βjx2
j + ug {αiti − ej(αiti)γ} (2)
where the two constants, ei and ej, stand for the non-negative esteem pa-
rameters, the α parameters are the agents’ respective marginal productivities of
eﬀort, the β’s measure the costs of eﬀort, and ug is an indicator function equal
to the unit value when the recipient accepts the gift. In the above speciﬁca-
tion, the total eﬀort chosen by agent i is allocated between production of his
own consumption good, xi, and production of a gift for j, ti. Therefore αixi
measures his consumption, and αiti corresponds to the amount of the gift. As
for the parameter γ, it determines whether the esteem component of the utility
function is concave, convex, or linear.
We assume that the game played is sequential: the recipient ﬁrst decides his
work eﬀort knowing that the gift-giver will then choose both his eﬀort for own
consumption and the size of the gift. This two-stage game can thus be solved
backwardly, starting with the gift maker’s maximization problem.
For the gift-maker, the optimal levels of own consumption and the gift are
obtained by maximizing his utility function with respect to xi and ti. The
















































Likewise, the optimal level of eﬀort of the recipient is obtained by maximizing







It is noteworthy that this value is independent of the amount of the gift. In
fact, it is strictly identical to the value obtained under autarky (which is derived
by maximizing j’s utility function from which the esteem component has been
removed). The next step is to check whether the gift is acceptable to player j,
the potential recipient. In fact, since self-produced consumption of player j is
independent of the value of the gift, the gift will be accepted only if its intrinsic
utility is greater than the loss of status involved. Comparing j’s utility in the
presence of the gift with his utility under autarky, and using (3), we obtain the
following condition:
αiti ≥ ej(αiti)γ ⇒ (γei) ≥ ej
Clearly, when status is inﬂuenced by the absolute amount of the gift, and when
the esteem function is concave or linear (γ ≤ 1), the importance attached to
social shame by the donee must not exceed that attached to social esteem by
the donor if the former is to accept the gift. And the stronger the concavity,








































7Making the players’ utility a function of the relative contribution of the
donor’s gift in the donee’s total consumption has the eﬀect of enriching our
framework in the two following senses. First, the recipient strategically selects
his work eﬀort, and, second, the impact of a gift on the social esteem component
of the utility of both agents is no more independent of the level of the recipient’s
production. As a ﬁrst attempt, we have used the logarithmic form to describe
the inﬂuence of social esteem on the two players’ utilities. Unfortunately, if this
speciﬁcation is rather easy to handle, it leads to results that do not have the
general character that we aim at. In particular, as shown in Appendix (A.1),
the equilibrium level of eﬀort of the recipient does not depend on the esteem
coeﬃcient of the donor, nor on the productivity of either agent.
We have, therefore, chosen to use a less elegant but more fecund speciﬁcation
which we write as follows, assuming as before that player i is the gift-maker:



















For the sake of computational convenience, we have written the argument of
the esteem component of the utility function not as the ratio of the gift to j’s
total consumption, but as the percentage by which the gift allows j to increase
his consumption4.
As in the previous speciﬁcation, the parameter γ determines the shape of
4When we use the ratio of the gift to j’s total consumption, denoted by F(xi,ti,xj),








































7the esteem function. This is evident from Figure (1), where the amount of social
esteem or shame experienced by player i, which is measured along the vertical
axis, varies according to the amount of the gift made or received by him, which
is measured along the horizontal axis. Three diﬀerent curves have been drawn
depending on the value of γ, all under the assumption that the eﬀort of the gift-
receiver is ﬁxed. In the North-East quadrant, i makes a gift to j, and enjoys
social prestige accordingly. By contrast, in the South-West quadrant, it is now
j who makes a gift to i, who suﬀers from social shame. It is debatable which
shape is more convenient to describe a phenomenon as complex as social esteem.
Yet, for our purpose, concavity appears to oﬀer a better description of human
emotions (γ < 1). The initial units of a gift received cause the greatest pain
in as much as they create a dependence on the donor’s goodwill. Additional
units have a diminished impact since the donee has become accustomed to his
dependent position. By analogy, this holds true for the donor as well: his social
prestige increases with his apparent generosity, but mostly when his relative
contribution to the donee’s consumption is low.
For the sake of completeness, however, we will check how the alternative
assumptions of a convex (γ > 1), or a linear (γ = 1), esteem function aﬀect our
results.
(multiple-root polynomials) that are very hard to handle analytically. We have, therefore,
opted for the speciﬁcation given in the text, that we denote by E(xi,ti,xj). The good news is
that this function behaves in a fairly similar fashion to F(.). Indeed, if we denote by Exn
j (.) its

















































































7Figure 1: Esteem Component of agent i’s utility function
We are now ready to solve the two-stage game of gift-and-esteem exchange
when players strategically interact.
3.2 First results
The maximization problem of player i, the potential gift-maker, when the gift
is both made and accepted, is given by:
Maxxi,ti








s.t. ti ≥ 0 (9)
xi ≥ 0 (10)




































































eiγ ≥ 1 if γ > 1
αjxj
eiγ ≤ 1 if γ < 1 (10’)
Starting with condition (10’), it is evident that, when the social esteem
function is concave, player i will agree to make a gift to player j only if the
latter’s self-produced consumption is small enough compared to the importance
attached to social esteem by the former. The opposite condition obtains when
the esteem function is convex. This is an intuitive result. Indeed, when social
esteem rises quickly at low levels of the recipient’s dependence on the donor,
the donor will choose to compel the recipient to exert much eﬀort, with the
consequence that the latter’s degree of dependence remains moderate. On the
other hand, as condition (9’) shows, player i will make a positive eﬀort towards
his own consumption (xi > 0) only if he is productive enough (high αi) and/or
the cost of his eﬀort is relatively low, and/or the importance attached to social
esteem by him is not too high (bear in mind that γ < 1). If it is too high,
indeed, his eﬀort would be totally absorbed in the production of the gift.
Let us now turn to the problem of the potential gift-receiver, player j. This








































7j’s utility function depicted by (7).














Under the hypothesis, to be veriﬁed later, that j accepts the gift, and keeping
in mind that γ < 1, we see that j’s equilibrium eﬀort is positive if and only
if ej > eiγ. Shall this inequality not hold, since xj is constrained to be non-
negative, it will be nil (j is a parasite), implying that no gift is made by i (as
is evident from condition (12)). In our model, therefore, parasitism cannot be
an equilibrium. From the above condition, ej > γei , it is evident that, in order
that the gift is made, the importance attached to social shame by j (measured by
the esteem coeﬃcient ej) should not be too small compared to the importance
attached to social prestige by i (measured by the esteem coeﬃcient ei). Yet,
the stronger the concavity of the social esteem function (the lower the value of
γ), the less stringent this condition.
Another conclusion follows from the above equations: the esteem coeﬃcient
of agent i must neither be too large, nor too small if a gift is to take place from
him to agent j. If it is too small, ti would equal zero according to (10) and (12),
and, if it is too large (compared to ej), condition ej > eiγ would be violated.
At this juncture, it is useful to make a pause to reﬁne our interpretation of
the equilibrium conditions. To make things clearer, we assume that γ = 1/2.
First consider the viewpoint of agent i. Since the marginal cost of production








































7gift-giving, we need not be concerned with this trade-oﬀ: at equilibrium the
marginal beneﬁts in both activities (own consumption and transfer) ought to
be identical and total eﬀort should be such that they both equal the marginal
cost of production. Raising ti by one unit implies a decrease of αi in the amount
of own consumption: the marginal opportunity cost of increasing ti is thus the
productivity of the gift-giver’s eﬀort. As for the marginal beneﬁt of the same, it
is measured in terms of a gain of esteem/status. Derived from (6), it is measured
by:
eiαi
2(αjxj)1/2(αjxj + αiti)1/2 > 0
This expression is positive but decreasing in αiti, since the esteem function
is concave. Moreover, larger values of αjxj push the marginal beneﬁt of gift-
giving downwards. Denoting by Ei the esteem component of the utility function












Clearly, a higher amount of eﬀort on the part of the beneﬁciary causes the
marginal value of gift-giving (as measured by ∂Ei/∂ti) to diminish. As a result,
in order to restore the equality between the marginal beneﬁt of own production
(αi) and the marginal beneﬁt of esteem (∂Ei/∂ti), the donor reduces the amount
of his gift. This is the meaning behind the comparative static result ∂ti/∂xj < 0
obtained from (12)5.



















































7Keeping in mind the logic behind the donor’s decision, we may turn to the
donee’s problem. After plugging the optimal value of the gift chosen by player
i in his utility function, we obtain for γ = 1/2:









Taking the ﬁrst order derivative w.r.t. xj, we get:











The marginal beneﬁt of xj is the sum of the ﬁrst and the fourth terms in the
above expression, that is, respectively, the marginal increase in self-produced
consumption, and a decrease in the loss of social esteem. Regarding the latter,
remember that, when xj is raised, i responds by diminishing the amount of the
gift, which eventually leads to a lower dependence ratio,
αjxj+αiti
αjxj .
The marginal cost, on the other hand, is the sum of the marginal cost of
eﬀort (the second term) and the reduced amount of the gift (the third term). It
is evident from this third term that the forsaken amount of the gift is a negative
function of αjxj.



















It is immediately obvious that, when the equilibrium amount of eﬀort of
agent j is positive, which implies that ej ≥ ei/2, the output produced by him


















































The ﬁrst two results are standard, and the third one reﬂects the fact that,
when agent j is more sensitive to social shame, he responds by increasing his
level of output so as to mitigate the social shame eﬀect. As for the eﬀect of
a change in agent i’s esteem coeﬃcient on agent j’s output (and eﬀort), it is
indeterminate. However, we will show at a later stage that this indeterminacy
can be lifted once we introduce further restrictions corresponding to the domain
of feasibility of the asymmetric gift exchange. It is straightforward that the
partial derivatives of j’s equilibrium amount of eﬀort with respect to βj and
ej have the same signs as those shown above. Yet, the eﬀect of a change in
αj on xj is negative, implying that productivity and eﬀort are substitutes in
the case of the gift beneﬁciary. This outcome contrasts with that obtained for
the gift-maker: as can be seen from equation (11), when agent i’s productivity
increases, his total eﬀort (and output) also increase.
The above discussion is based on the assumption that the social esteem
function is concave. When this function is convex or linear, it appears that
interior solutions can no more be obtained. In the case of convexity, player j
will either choose to produce no eﬀort at all, or to apply an inﬁnite amount of
eﬀort. In the former case, player i will make no gift, while, in the latter case,
he will produce the maximum amount of gift compatible with his productive
ability. In the case of linearity, irrespective of the amount of eﬀort applied by








































7amount compatible with his productive ability (hence the fact that the case
γ = 1 does not ﬁgure out in condition (10’)).
A formal proof of these results is provided in Appendix A.2.
4 Conditions for mutual agreement on a gift
We may now embark upon the central task of determining whether player j
will actually accept the gift proposed by player i. To answer this question,
we compare the utility that player j would gain by accepting the gift with his
stand alone utility: j is induced to accept the gift if the former exceeds the

































































Unfortunately, the above condition is analytically intractable. To simplify
matters, we shall set γ = 1/2, and try to elucidate under what conditions a
patron-client relation is likely to emerge and determine the characteristics of





















































7The stage is now set for an inquiry about the feasibility of a mutually prof-
itable (asymmetrical) gift exchange in the relevant domain of the esteem coef-
ﬁcients.
To begin with, let us write down the value of the gift potentially made
by agent i when the equilibrium eﬀort level applied by player j is taken into
account. This is done by plugging equation (13) into equation (17). We thus





























where κ is the ratio of esteem coeﬃcients (κ = ej/ei), and X measures the
(squared) productivity of player j relative to his eﬀort cost (X = α2
j/βj).
The interpretation of this condition is straightforward: a gift is more likely to
be made by agent i when (1) agent i puts more weight on social esteem, (2) agent
j attaches lower importance on social esteem/shame, and (3) the productivity
of agent j is lower (or his eﬀort cost higher).
For the potential gift made by agent i to be acceptable by j, we know that
condition (16) must be satisﬁed. With the above notations, it can be re-written
in a form that is more simple, yet remains diﬃcult to interpret:
X1/3(4κei − X) ≥ 3e
4/3
i (2κ − 1)2/3 (19)








































7gift by j, we must resort to the simulation technique, at least as a ﬁrst step, in
order to highlight the critical factors that eventually determine the feasibility
of an asymmetrical gift exchange. Towards that purpose, we use equations (18)
and (19). The method followed consists of ﬁxing ei, and then varying the X
and κ parameters to see when the above two conditions are satisﬁed.
In Figure (2), the dark-shaded area depicts the domain of (X, κ) values
within which the gift is accepted by agent j, assuming that ei = 10. This
domain is made of two triangle-like areas, one of which is inverted, touching
each other at their summits. The interpretation of these results is as follows.
Looking at the lower triangle, it appears that, when the potential donee attaches
more importance to social shame (higher values of κ), he is less likely to accept
the gift, which is according to intuition. For a given, rather low value of ej
(κ < 1), j’s inducement to accept the gift increases with his own productivity,
yet only up to to a certain point beyond which his inducement starts to decrease.
Ultimately, the gift is refused. Bear in mind that an increase in the productivity
of agent j implies that, all other things being equal, his degree of dependence
on agent i’s goodwill is lower and, therefore, the cost of a gift in terms of loss of
esteem is smaller. Above a certain threshold, however, his productivity becomes
so large that he prefers to remain autarkic.
Less obvious is the situation described by the upper, inverted, triangle. As
the weight put on social shame increases above a certain threshold, which is
in the neighbourhood of 1 (ei = ej), the prospect of acceptance of the gift by








































7Figure 2: Gift acceptability condition (ei = 10)
not too high (or his cost of eﬀort is moderately low, yet not too low). The idea
is that, when shame weighs much on the utility of agent j, he tends to react
to a gift by considerably increasing his own production, which necessitates that
his productivity is large enough. Above a certain level of productivity, however,
he prefers to avoid social shame altogether by refusing the gift and living in
autarky.
Does the result depicted in Figure (2) depends on the value of the donor’s
esteem coeﬃcient? To answer that question, we have drawn, in Figure (3), the
domain of acceptability of the gift when the value of ei is reduced from 10 to 1.
It is immediately apparent that, if the shape of the domain is broadly similar,
it has shifted leftwards and its size has been considerably reduced. With ei = 1,
only low values of the recipient’s productivity are susceptible of inducing him








































7income-earning capacity, a transfer of a given amount represents a larger share
of his income which makes the gift more acceptable to him even though the gift
is rather small (owing to the donor’s low sensitivity to social esteem or power).
To sum up, a patron-client relationship is more likely to arise when the
potential donor puts a greater weight on social esteem or power. This may
imply that patronage has a more fertile ground to grow on if the group to which
the donor and the recipient belong has a larger size. Indeed, as pointed out
by Fessler (2001) on the basis of experimental psychological evidence, there
is a positive relationship between the esteem coeﬃcients and the number of
witnesses: ‘the intensity of Shame or Pride experienced is in part contingent
on the audience present’ (p.201). This is true, however, only if the number of
witnesses belong to the reference group of the donors and donees: an agent can
obtain positive or negative approval from people who know his behaviour only
if the latter are able, in one way or another, to communicate their feelings to
him (Hollnder, 1990 p.1159).
Let us now look at the condition for gift making by agent i (condition (18)).
The corresponding domain of feasibility is depicted by the dark shaded area in
Figure (4). When the two feasibility areas are superimposed on each other, we
obtain Figure (5). A striking feature is that the upper triangle appearing in
Figures (2) and (3), which describe the condition for gift acceptability by agent
j, has vanished. As has been pointed out earlier, above a certain value of ej,
agent j starts putting in a lot of eﬀort to mitigate the eﬀect of social shame








































7Figure 3: Gift acceptability condition (ei = 1)
mind that the argument in the esteem function is not the absolute value of the
gift, but the share it represents in j’s consumption).
The salient result emerging from Figures (2) and (3) is that there exists a
critical value of κ, equal to one, above which the feasibility domain is empty.
In words, asymmetric gift exchanges are infeasible when the weight attached to
shame by the recipient exceeds the weight attached to social esteem or prestige
by the gift-maker6.
This important result which we had already obtained under the ﬁrst spec-
iﬁcation of the social esteem function (see supra, Section 3.1), can be proved
formally.
6If we believe David Hume for whom ‘we are more elevated with the view of one below
us, than mortiﬁed with the presence of one above us’ (Hume, 1888: Book II, Section X, 390),








































7Figure 4: Gift making condition
Denoting ϕ = ei/X, conditions (18) and (19) can be rewritten thus:
ϕ + 1
2
≥ κ or ϕ = ei/X ≥ 2κ − 1 (18’)
4κ(ϕX)X1/3 − X4/3 − 3(ϕX)4/3(2κ − 1)2/3
= 4κϕ − 3ϕ4/3(2κ − 1)2/3 − 1 ≥ 0 (19’)
It is then evident that, when κ = ϕ = 1, the two conditions hold with strict
equality. This means that, when sensitivities of the two agents to social esteem
or shame are identical (κ = 1), and when the parameters measuring such sen-
sitivities are exactly equal to X = α2
j/βj (ei = ej = X), the two agents are
just indiﬀerent between entering into an asymmetric gift exchange relationship
and remaining autarkic. It can then be shown that if κ is varied marginally
around unit value while ϕ is adjusted so that the gift-making condition stays








































7lated when κ > 1. By contrast, when κ is lowered marginally below one, and ϕ
is adjusted in the aforementioned manner, condition (19’) holds, yet is no more
binding: agent i is just indiﬀerent between making the gift and not making it
while agent j strongly prefers the patronage relationship to autarky. Moreover,
the conclusion that the domain where κ > 1 is infeasible holds a fortiori true if
agent i is assumed to have a strong rather than a weak preference for patronage
compared to autarky - (18’) is not binding (see Appendix A.3 for the complete
proof).
Combining this ﬁnding with the earlier result that ej/ei > 1/2 if agent i is
to agree to make a gift to agent j, we see that a patronage relationship may be
established only in the restricted domain where the ratio of esteem parameters,
κ, belongs to [1
2;1]7.
In Figure (6), we show, in the three-dimensional space, and for ei = 5, how
the net value of the recipient’s utility - equal to his gross utility minus his stand
alone-utility - varies depending on the values taken by X and κ. This allows us
to deﬁne the set of parameter values for which the recipient enjoys maximum
utility. The Figure shows the domain of mutual proﬁtability of the gift which
corresponds to the shaded triangle-like area corresponding to κ-values smaller
than 1 (and higher than 1/2). It is then apparent that the highest level of utility
is attained by agent j when his esteem coeﬃcient is the lowest in the acceptable
range. This result can be proven formally (see Appendix A.4). More caution is
7By analogy, we can conlude that agent j will want to make a gift acceptable to agent i








































7Figure 5: Feasibility of asymmetric gift exchange (ei = 10)
needed when addressing the question of the most desirable values of X. Indeed,
as we can ﬁnd by diﬀerentiating j’s net utility with respect to X and setting it
equal to zero8, these values vary with the assumed magnitude of ei. Indeed, the




= ei(2κ − 1)1/2,
from which it is evident that ∂X∗/∂ei > 0, for a given κ. In words, the larger the
weight put on social prestige by the donor, the higher the recipient’s productivity
must be to aﬀord him maximum utility from receiving a gift from the former.
The intuition behind this new result is as follows: the more productive agent
j, the more likely he is to accept a gift from a generous agent whose utility
depends heavily on social esteem, since he is better able to respond to the gift
by increasing his own production.















































7Figure 6: Gift acceptability condition (ei = 5)
The proposition below summarizes our main results:
Proposition 1 An asymmetric gift exchange relationship can be established
only if the importance attached to social shame by the recipient is smaller,
yet not too much smaller, that the importance attached to social esteem by the
donor. From the standpoint of the recipient, maximum utility is obtained when
the weight of shame is as low as possible. The potential donor is more likely to
make a gift if his utility is more greatly inﬂuenced by social esteem considera-
tions.
5 Further results
Before concluding the paper, three interesting questions deserve to be answered.








































7agents of identical productivities (and eﬀort costs)? Second, may reciprocal
gifts be exchanged in the presence of social esteem and shame? Third, does
aggregate output increases, decreases, or remain constant when autarky gives
rise to patronage? We address these three questions successively.
We can show that the answer to the ﬁrst question is positive within our
analytical framework. The easiest way is to construct an example in which
agents i and j have similar levels of eﬀort productivity and cost (α2
i/βi =
α2
j/βj = 9). Assuming that κ = ej/ei = 0.6 and that ei = 10, we ﬁnd that
the two conditions for the feasibility of asymmetric gift exchange, conditions
(18) and (19), are satisﬁed. Moreover, we verify that an interior solution is
obtained: as a matter of fact, the condition α2
i/βi > αiti is fulﬁlled, ensuring
that agent i produces enough to have a positive amount of private consumption
(see Appendix A.5 for a series of simulations conﬁrming the above result). In
fact, it is even possible that agent j, who accepts a gift made by agent i, has a
(moderately) higher productivity.
This is an important result since the common view prevails that, for pa-
tronage to exist, there must be a dominating party, the patron, who is more
productive than the dominated one, the client, typically because he is better
endowed with wealth or productive resources. Our claim, here, is that a diﬀer-
ence in social esteem coeﬃcients is suﬃcient to produce patronage even between
individuals of identical abilities. In other words, a person can accept an inferior
position on the social ladder only because of a rather low sensitivity to the neg-








































7such a situation is a particular case that arises only for speciﬁc conﬁgurations
of the esteem and productivity parameters. Hence our next proposition:
Proposition 2 An asymmetric gift exchange relationship, in which income is
traded against social esteem or political power, can sometimes arise between two
agents endowed with the same eﬀort productivities, or in a situation where the
recipient has a (moderately) higher productivity than the gift-maker. What is
required is that the client is not too sensitive to social shame while the patron
pays enough attention to social esteem.
Let us now turn to the second question. Here the answer turns out to be
negative: in our model, it is not possible that the two agents are involved in a
reciprocal exchange of gifts. This directly follows from the fact that the critical
value of κ (the ratio of esteem coeﬃcients) above which an asymmetric transfer
may not take place from agent i to agent j has been shown to be equal to one.
This condition, which must be satisﬁed if a gift is to be made by agent i and
accepted by agent j, is logically contradictory with the inverse condition that
1/κ < 1, which is necessary for a gift to be made by agent j and accepted
by agent i. Our analytical framework based on social esteem considerations, is,
therefore, not appropriate to understand mechanisms of reciprocal, symmetrical,
gift exchanges. As underlined in the ﬁrst two sections, our concern is with
asymmetrical social relationships in which an agent is subordinated to another
agent and somehow accepts this situation.
Finally, there is the question of the variation of aggregate output between








































7same amount of output under the two systems. As a consequence, to answer
the third question, we just have to look at the output response on the part of
the potential donee.
His eﬀort when receiving a gift is given by equation (13). Replacing γ by 1/2
in this expression and comparing it to the stand alone eﬀort of agent j (which is
equivalent to eﬀort deﬁned by equation (5)), we derive the following condition







Using the above-deﬁned notations, this condition becomes:
(2κ − 1)ϕ2 < 1 (20)
Bearing in mind that 1/2 < κ ≤ 1 (since j > γei), so that 0 < 2κ − 1 ≤ 1, it
is evident that no upper bound for the ϕ parameter can be determined. The
only clear result is that condition (20) always holds when ϕ ≤ 1 or ei ≤ X.
When ϕ > 1, the sign of the inequality is ambiguous and the variation of
aggregate output cannot be known. This said, three meaningful eﬀects come
out of condition (20). To begin with, bearing in mind that κ = ej/ei, it is
evident that the lower ej, the higher the likelihood that the above condition
is satisﬁed. The interpretation is as follows: if the beneﬁciary of the gift has
a low sensitivity to social shame, he will not be keen to exert much eﬀort to









































7Moreover, keeping in mind that ϕ = ei/X and X = α2
j/βj, relaxation of
eﬀort on the part of agent j is more likely to occur if, ceteris paribus, his
productivity is higher. This is because, as we have seen earlier (see supra,
section 3.2), productivity and eﬀort are substitutes for the agent who beneﬁts
from the transfer. When the recipient’s productivity increases, the utility of the
donor decreases because the dependence of j is reduced for a given amount of
the gift. The donor responds by reducing the gift, and the beneﬁciary counters
this move by relaxing his eﬀort so as to increase his degree of dependence vis ` a
vis the donor.
Finally, rewriting condition (20) as 1/X2(2ejei − e2
i) < 0, and bearing in
mind that ej ≤ ei in the feasible domain, it is apparent that an increase in
ei has the eﬀect of relaxing the constraint. This means that the output of
the beneﬁciary is more likely to decrease when the donor pays more attention
to social esteem. It is interesting to notice that, in the feasibility domain,
the above-noted indeterminacy of the sign of the partial derivative of xj and
αjxj with respect to ei no more exists. Indeed, using (16) together with the
deﬁnitions of X and κ, the equilibrium output of agent j can be written as
1
2(Xe2
i(2κ − 1))1/3. The partial derivative of this expression with respect to ei








· (κ − 1). Since we know that
the feasibility domain is such that κ ∈ [1/2;1], the sign of this expression is
unambiguously negative. The underlying rationale is that, when agent i is more
sensitive to social esteem, he is inclined to make a larger gift to agent j, and








































7is actually the net outcome of two eﬀects running into opposite directions with
the ﬁrst eﬀect outweighing the second one. On the one hand, enjoying a larger
transfer, j is induced to exert less eﬀort himself but, on the other hand, he
is also eager to mitigate the increase in social shame that this larger transfer
entails, and the way to do that is to increase his own level of eﬀort.
We can now write our last proposition.
Proposition 3 The establishment of an asymmetric gift exchange relationship
is more likely to cause a reduction of output on the part of the recipient and,
thereby, a reduction of total output if: (i) the recipient is less sensitive to social
shame; (ii) his productivity is higher (or his eﬀort cost is lower); and (iii) the
donor is more sensitive to social esteem.
6 Conclusion and application
The central result obtained in this paper is that an asymmetric gift exchange
equilibrium can occur only if the importance attached to social shame by a
recipient is smaller than that attached to social esteem by a donor. Moreover,
an income transfer is more likely to be traded against social esteem, status,
or power when the weight put on these attributes by the donor or patron is
higher. Whether this condition is fulﬁlled may crucially hinge on the size and
the composition of the audience witnessing the gift exchange. We also show that,
depending on the conﬁgurations of the esteem coeﬃcients of the two parties, the








































7of feasibility of asymmetric gift exchange. Contrary to a commonly prevailing
view, productivities might be identical between donor and donee. In fact, the
productivity of the donee/client could even be (moderately) smaller than that of
the donor/patron. It is moreover possible, but not certain, that the beneﬁciary
of the transfer will reduce his eﬀort. This is more likely to occur if he is not too
sensitive to social shame (or the donor is sensitive enough to social esteem) or
if his productivity is suﬃciently high (or his eﬀort cost is suﬃciently low).
Note that there is an interesting parallel between the above results and those
obtained in Platteau and Seki (2007). In this paper, indeed, sensitivity to social
esteem/shame, assumed to be identical for both agents, must exceed a minimum
threshold if the most able agent is to agree to make a transfer and beneﬁt from
the associated local status eﬀect while it must not be too high lest the less able
agent should prefer autarky to receiving the transfer and suﬀering from social
shame.
Aid relationships oﬀer an interesting application of the theory. It has been
shown empirically that the destination of bilateral aid ﬂows can largely be ex-
plained by geopolitical considerations rather than by the characteristics of re-
cipient countries that reﬂect need or strong absorption capacity (e.g., quality of
governance). What is at work is a patronage logic whereby a dominating rich
country provides aid to a poor, dominated country in exchange for the latter’s
allegiance, or subordination.
Interestingly, not all developing countries enter into such patronage relation-








































7in particular for big countries such as China and India, the cost of subordina-
tion seems to be too high to make them accept aid transfers (on a substantial
scale). As convincingly argued by Janos (1982), self-esteem considerations also
operate at the level of nations. What must be added is that all countries are
not equally self-conscious or sensitive to a sense of national pride. This depends
on the history of the nation which may largely determine the strength of its
feelings of national identity, and the extent to which it wants to be respected
by foreign entities. The fact that countries which are today reluctant to enter
into aid dependence relationships may not have displayed such a reluctance in
the past (think of China during the 1950s and India during the 1960s) attests
that other variables are at play. Among these other variables are the levels of
poverty and the need for aid on the part of the laggard countries - China and
India, in the immediate post-war period, were of course much poorer and less
technologically developed than they are today -, which in our model are reﬂected
in the productivity parameters. Another consideration, which is not taken care
of by our model, is the possible existence of competition among donor countries:
India accepted large aid transfers from the United States and the Soviet Union
partly because these two donor countries were rivalrous superpowers in the tense
international context of the cold war. As a result, India did not become subor-
dinated to either of them. By contrast, for ideological reasons, China accepted
massive aid from the Soviet Union but no aid from the United States, as a result
of which it became subordinated to the U.S.S.R. It is therefore not surprising








































7was disrupted in the summer of 1960 (Riskin, 1987, p.130-131).
Following the logic of our model, poor countries under continuous depen-
dence vis-` a-vis donor countries will produce less than they would under autarky
if the cost of subordination is not acutely felt by them, and/or if some rich coun-
tries are eager to secure a clientele in the developing world. This is perhaps an









































A.1 Logarithmic speciﬁcation of the esteem component of
utility
When the esteem component of the utility function is a logarithmic function of
the percentage by which the gift made by i allows j to increase his consumption
(i.e. the same argument that we use throughout the paper and for which we








The two FOCs are then:
∂(.)
∂xi






= 2βi(xi + ti)
Combining these two conditions, we get:
αiti = ei − αjxj





















































7A.2 Corner Solutions when the esteem component of the
utility function is convex or linear
A.2.1 Convexity: γ = 2
When γ = 2, meaning that the esteem component of the players’ utility func-




= αi − 2βi(xi + ti)
∂Ui
∂ti
= −2βi(xi + ti) +
2eiαi(αjxj + αiti)
(αjxj)2
After setting them both equal to zero and combining them, we can derive the



















Replacing the best response of i in terms of gift transfer in the maximization











(2ei − ej) − 2βj ≶ 0
When the LHS is smaller to zero, we have the corner solution xj = 0: agent
j behaves in a parasitic fashion as a result of which agent i refuses to make a
gift. On the other hand, when the LHS is positive, the would-be recipient has
an incentive to always increase his eﬀort, xo
j → ∞.
In the latter case, the gift-maker will dedicate all his eﬀort to producing the
gift: to








































7A.2.2 Linearity: γ = 1
When γ = 1, the esteem component of the players’ utility functions is linear.
The F.O.C.s for the potential gift-giver (player i) are the following:
∂Ui(.)/∂xi = αi − 2βi(xi + ti)2 = 0




Combining these two conditions, we get that αjxj = ei. It is therefore impossi-
ble to determine the equilibrium values of xi and ti from the above two FOCs.
What we have is a corner solution in which either agent i produces only for the
sake of providing a gift to agent j (ei > αjxj), or in which i produces only for
his own consumption (ei < αjxj).
A.3 Feasibility of asymmetric gift exchange: the restric-
tion on κ
Let us vary κ marginally around unit value. It is immediately evident that
condition (18’) remains satisﬁed only if ϕ undergoes an even larger variation
than κ. Knowing this, we must examine how condition (19’) evolves. What we
show is that the LHS of (19’) becomes negative when κ > 1: the potential donee
will not accept the gift if he is more sensitive to social shame than the donor is
to social esteem or prestige. To prove this, let us denote the LHS of (19’) by Ψ,
bearing in mind that ϕ = (2κ − 1) when (18’) is binding: Ψ = 4κϕ − 3ϕ2 − 1.








































7the unit value. We can then write that:
dΨ = 4ϕdκ + (4κ − 6ϕ)2dκ
Or:
dΨ/dκ = −8ϕ + 8κ = 8(1 − κ)
once we use again the property that ϕ = 2κ − 1. This expression is obviously
negative when κ > 1:
dΨ/dκ Q 0 ⇔ κ R 1
When κ increases marginally above 1, Ψ will decrease and condition (19’) is
violated. On the other hand, when κ is lowered marginally below one, condition
(19’) is satisﬁed and is no more binding: agent j now strongly prefers the
patronage relationship to autarky.
To complete the proof, we want to check whether the above result holds
a fortiori when we assume that agent i strongly prefers patronage to autarky.
Starting again from the benchmark case where κ = ϕ = 1, and adjusting ϕ to
κ so that (18’) is no more binding, we ﬁnd that condition (19’) can be satisﬁed
only in the domain where κ < 1. The proof is as follows. We start from the
situation where ϕ = 2κ − 1 and shift to a new situation where ϕ > 2κ − 1, or
κ < (ϕ+1)/2. We, therefore, assume that dϕ = 2δdκ, with δ > 1. We can then
write:
























































δ > 1 and, hence, (3 − 1
δ) > 2, κ exceeds ϕ to an even larger extent than in the
vicinity of κ = 1, where (18’) continues to be binding. We now have the following
two conditions: κ > ϕ and κ < (ϕ + 1)/2, which can never be simultaneously
satisﬁed if κ ≥ 1. On the other hand, if κ < 1, the two above conditions can
possibly be satisﬁed depending on the values of the two parameters (the gap
between κ and ϕ must not be too large).
A.4 Optimal characteristics for gift acceptance
The individual whose utility is the highest when receiving a gift is the one for
whom the following expression, which is derived from (19), is maximized with
respect to X:






Taking the ﬁrst order w.r.t. X, and setting it equal to zero, we obtain that




. This value does maximize f(X) because
f
0
(X) > 0 and f
00
(X) < 0. Plugging this value f(X), we have that :
f(X∗) = 4κei − ei(2κ − 1)1/2 − 3ei(2κ − 1)1/2 = κ − (2κ − 1)1/2
We can then infer that:
f(X∗) ≥ 0 ⇒ κ2 − 2κ + 1 ≥ 0
which is true ∀κ ≥ 0. We can, therefore, conclude that values of αj and βj








































7A.5 Simulation results for symmetric productivity param-
eters
Up to here we have deﬁned X = α2
j/βj. Let us now index X so that Xj = α2
j/βj
and Xi = α2
i/βi.
Here below, we provide the reader with a series of simulations of eﬀorts
applied by agent i towards own consumption and towards gift transfer, and of
eﬀort applied by agent j, under speciﬁc conditions in which both agents are
equally productive (Xi = Xj). It is immediately evident that agent i may make
positive gifts to agent j in the presence of identical eﬀort productivities.
ei ej κ αi βi αj βj Xi Xj αiti αixi αjxj αjxj + αiti
10 9 0.9 1 0.05 1 0.05 20 20 6.5 3.5 2.71 9.21
10 7 0.7 1 0.05 1 0.05 20 20 9.45 0.55 2.15 11.6
5 4 0.8 1 0.1 1 0.1 10 10 2.47 2.53 1.55 4.02
5 3 0.6 1 0.1 1 0.1 10 10 4.72 0.28 1.08 5.8
1 0.8 0.8 1 1.25 1 1.25 0.8 0.8 0.25 0.15 0.39 0.64
1 1 1 1 2 1 2 0.5 0.5 0.23 0.02 0.4 0.63
0.5 0.4 0.7 1 1.67 1 1.67 0.6 0.6 0.01 0.29 0.25 0.25
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